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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Frank J. Tankovich appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
the jury verdicts finding him guilty malicious harassment and conspiracy to 
commit malicious harassment. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
One afternoon while Ken and Kim Requena were in their garage, they saw 
a truck drive by with five people inside. (Tr., p.1754, L.15 - p.1756, L.17; p.1817, 
L.8 - p.1818, L.2; p.2032, L.10 - p.2033, L.10.) Ken, who is Puerto Rican, 
noticed the men inside the truck were staring at them and that there was a 
swastika drawn in the dirt on the truck. (Tr., p.1752, L.17; p.1756, L.9 - p.1757, 
L.7.) On the other side of the truck, also written in dirt, was the phrase, "Born 2 
Kill." (Tr., p.1818, Ls.3-15.) 
The truck stopped at a nearby stop sign and then backed up to the front of 
the Requenas' driveway. (Tr., p.1757, Ls.9-18; p.1817, Ls.17-19.) The 
Requenas testified that Tankovich, who was driving the truck, got out and quickly 
approached the end of the driveway and said, "Hey, come over here." (Tr., 
p.1757, L.24 - p.1758, L.3; p.1760, Ls.13-14.) Tankovich's brothers, William and 
Ira also got out of the truck. (Tr., p.1760, L.17 - p.1761, L.11; p.1847, L.24-
p.1849, L.14.) Julie Oliver, one of the Requenas' neighbors, testified that the 
men were yelling and when she told them to leave, one of them told her to "shut 
up." (Tr., p.1819, Ls.1-12.) 
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Ken told his wife, Kim, to go inside and call 911 and bring him his gun. 
(Tr., p.1758, Ls.13-14.) When Ken got his gun, he cocked it so the Tankoviches 
could see it, hoping the gesture would make them leave. (Tr., p.1758, Ls.16-18.) 
Although the Tankoviches left, they threatened that they would be back. (Tr., 
p.1759, Ls.17-21; p.1850, Ls.9-18) The police arrived shortly thereafter and took 
statements from the Requenas and one of their neighbors. (Tr., p.1761, L.23-
p.1762, L.6; p.1821, Ls.5-10; p.1850, Ls.19-24.) 
Twenty to thirty minutes later, the Tankoviches made good on their threat 
to return. (Tr., p.1728, Ls.2-6; p.1762, Ls.11-24.) This time, Tankovich and 
William travelled on foot with a pit bull in tow. (Tr., p.1727, Ls.10-17; p.1762, 
Ls.20-23.) They came to the end of Ken's driveway and told him he "fucked up." 
(Tr., p.1764, Ls.7-10.) Kim testified that Tankovich specifically threatened: "You 
fucked with the wrong people. I am going to fuck you up." (Tr., p.1852, LS.12-
19.) At about the same time, Ira approached on foot from another direction; 
however, he was intercepted by police who had arrived back on scene after 
receiving another 911 dispatch. (Tr., p.1853, L.2 - p.1855, L.13.) As the police 
approached, Ira threw a gun, which the police recovered. (Tr., p.1766, Ls.14-24; 
p.1855, Ls.5-9.) During a subsequent search of Ira, law enforcement discovered 
he was also in possession of a knife. (Tr., p.1979, L.21 - p.1980, L.3.) 
The police detained Tankovich and William. (Tr., p.1768, Ls.5-9.) While 
the police were talking to Tankovich and William, both men repeatedly called Ken 
a "fuckin' beaner" and Tankovich threatened that they would "take care of 
business" and "take care" of the "beaner" themselves. (Tr., p.1769, Ls.4-17; 
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p.1856, Ls.4-16.) William also called the officers "pigs." (Tr., p.1911, Ls.24-25.) 
The Tankoviches eventually left. (Tr., p.1770, Ls.5-11.) 
Although the police did not arrest Tankovich or William on the date of the 
incident, a grand jury later indicted Tankovich, William, and Ira, on one count of 
malicious harassment and one count of conspiracy to commit malicious 
harassment. 1 (R., Vol. 1, pp.1-3; Vol. 2, pp.241-43; Vol. 3, p.414-16; see Tr., 
p.404, L.12 - p.409, L.3.) The state filed a motion to join all three cases for trial, 
which the district court ultimately granted. (R., Vol. 1, pp.35, 55-66, 68-69, 73-
75.) 
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking admission of expert 
testimony from Tim Higgins regarding the culture and symbolism of white 
supremacists. (R., Vol. 3, pp.482-86.) In particular, the state sought to have Mr. 
Higgins testify about the relationship between white supremacy groups and some 
of the Tankoviches' tattoos, which included inverted stars with the words "Aryan 
Pride" (Tr., p.2078, L.13 - p.2079, L.9; Exhibit 6), the SS "bolts" symbols (Tr., 
p.2079, L.23 - p.2080, L.6; Exhibit 8), and a three-leaf clover, which is a 
"traditional Aryan Symbol" (Tr., p.2080, Ls.7-13; Exhibit 9). The court allowed 
limited testimony from Mr. Higgins on this issue. 
1 The court later dismissed the malicious harassment charge against Ira finding a 
lack of evidence to support the charge, but found sufficient probable cause for 
the conspiracy charge against all three defendants. (Tr., p.157, L.21 - p.160, 
L.6.) 
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The jury convicted both Tankovich and William of malicious harassment 
and conspiracy to commit malicious harassment.2 (R., Vol. 4, p.632; Tr., p.2236, 
L.15 - p.2237, L.12.) Tankovich filed a motion for a new trial, which the court 
denied. (R., Vol. 4, pp.634-36, 694-705.) The court subsequently imposed 
concurrent unified five-year sentences with four years fixed on both counts, but 
suspended the sentences and placed Tankovich on two years of supervised 
probation. (R., Vol. 4, pp.715-18.) Tankovich filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
Vol. 1, ROA, p.13; Notice of Appeal dated May 10, 2011 (file folder).) 
2 The verdicts finding Tankovich guilty occurred at the conclusion of the third jury 
trial set in this matter. The first trial ended in a mistrial after the court concluded 
inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury. (Trial Tr., pp.439-58.) The 
court also declared a mistrial in the second trial as to Tankovich and Frank after 
the jury could not reach a verdict as to either defendant; however, the jury in that 




Tankovich states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to 
Sever trials? 
B. Did the District Court err by allowing testimony and evidence of 
the tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 
C. Did the District Court err by allowing expert testimony regarding 
the same tattoos borne by Frank Tankovich's codefendants? 
D. Did the District Court err by failing to dismiss the case against 
Frank Tankovich? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Tankovich failed to establish the district court erred in declining to 
sever his trial in order to avoid any alleged prejudice that might result from 
consideration of evidence that the jury was instructed was not admissible against 
him? 
2. Has Tankovich failed to show error in the district court's decision allowing 
testimony to be admitted against his co-defendants? 
3. Should this Court decline to consider Tankovich's challenge to the 
admission of expert testimony regarding the racial symbolism of his co-
defendants' tattoos since the claim is not preserved? Even if considered, has 
Tankovich failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
expert testimony regarding the racial symbolism associated with his co-
defendants' tattoos? 
4. Was there substantial, competent evidence from which the jury found 
Tankovich guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of malicious harassment and 




Tankovich Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Sever 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to join the Tankoviches' cases for trial, 
which the district court granted. (R., Vol. 1, pp.35, 55-66, 68-69, 73-75.) 
Tankovich subsequently filed a motion to sever, asserting joinder violated his 
rights to a fair trial, to compulsory process, and to confrontation. (R., Vol. 1, 
pp.69-70.) At the hearing on his motion, Tankovich argued his case should be 
severed because, he asserted, evidence of William's and Ira's tattoos was not 
admissible against him. (Tr., p.86, L.13 - p.90, L.22.) The court took the matter 
under advisement (Tr., p.141, Ls.12-14) and subsequently denied Tankovich's 
motion to sever (Tr., p.174, L.13 - p.176, L.3). 
On appeal, Tankovich argues the district court erred in denying his 
request to sever his trial because, he contends, joinder was "prejudicial to this 
case, due to the evidence of tattoos borne by the codefendants, and the expert 
witness testimony offered by the State regarding those tattoos." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.4.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case 
shows the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tankovich's motion 
to sever. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"A motion to sever is directed to the trial court's discretion, and this Court 
will not overturn a denial of the motion unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion." State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 55 P.3d 896 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 824, 992 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
When reviewing a discretionary decision, this Court considers: 
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 907-08, 55 P.3d at 900-01 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 
Idaho 598, 600, 76 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
C. Tankovich Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Denying His Motion To Sever 
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides, in relevant part: 
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder 
of offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or 
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order 
the state to elect between counts, grant separate trials of counts, 
grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief 
justice requires. 
"When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on 
appeal is whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair 
prejudice resulted from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair triaL" 
Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 901,55 P.3d at 908 (citing State v. Cierelli, 115 Idaho 732, 
734, 769 P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App. 1989)). The "potential sources of prejudice" 
that have been recognized by Idaho's appellate courts include: 
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(a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the 
evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; 
(b) the potential that the defendant may be confounded in 
presenting defenses; and (c) the possibility that the jury may 
conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him or 
her guilty of the other simply because of his or her criminal 
disposition, i.e. he or she is a bad person. 
Eguilior at 908, 55 P.3d at 901 (citation omitted). 
Tankovich argues that the failure to sever his case resulted in prejudice 
arising from "the danger that the jury would cumulate the evidence" and that he 
"would be confounded in presenting his defenses." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Both 
of these arguments fail. 
Tankovich's argument that there was danger "that the jury would cumulate 
the evidence" is based on the admission of the tattoo evidence.3 (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.4-5.) This argument fails because the court instructed the jury that the 
tattoo evidence was not admissible against Tankovich. (Tr., p.2124, Ls.9-23; R., 
Vol. 4, p.651.) Before Mr. Higgins testified, the court advised the jury: 
The next witness is going to present some testimony that will 
attempt to aid you in potentially understanding the possible 
meaning of some of the tattoos that have been entered into 
evidence in this case. Mr. Frank Tankovich -- there's been no 
evidence that Mr. Frank Tankovich has any tattoos, so it's important 
3 The potential prejudice that results from the cumulation of evidence traditionally 
applies where a defendant is charged with the multiple offenses committed 
against different victims or committed on different dates, thereby creating a 
concern that the evidence related to the separate offenses will be cumulated by 
the jury as opposed to the jury considering the evidence of each offense 
separately. See,~, Eguilior, CITE; State v. Gooding, 110 Idaho 856, 858, 719 
P.2d 405, 407 (1986) (finding no error in the failure to sever due because "the 
facts relating to each incident were so distinct and simple that there was little risk 
the jury would confuse or cumulate the evidence in applying the court's 
instructions to the evidence in the case"). Nevertheless, the state will address 
Tankovich's argument that the jury "cumulate[d]" the tattoo evidence with the 
evidence admitted against him. 
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for you to understand that you should not consider the evidence 
that's about to be presented to you with respect to the tattoos in 
question in the case against Mr. Frank Tankovich charging him with 
the crime of malicious harassment. 
(Tr., p.2124, Ls.12-23.) The jury also received a limiting instruction in writing. 
Instruction No. 13 reads: 
You are about to receive testimony from a witness relating to the 
possible meaning of certain tattoos that have been reflected in 
certain photos admitted into evidence. There has been no 
evidence of any tattoos on the person of Frank Tankovich. You 
should not consider the evidence about the tattoos in deciding the 
charge of Malicious Harassment against Frank Tankovich. 
(R., Vol. 4, p.651.) 
The court further instructed the jury that it "must give separate, personal 
consideration to the charge against each defendant. Each is entitled to a verdict 
based upon the evidence and the law which applies to that defendant." (R., Vol. 
4, p.666.) 
The limiting instructions given to the jury regarding the tattoo evidence 
prevented whatever prejudice may have accrued to Tankovich as a result of the 
fact that his brothers had racist tattoos. See Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 909, 55 P.3d 
at 902 (rejecting claim that court erred in denying motion to sever, noting, in part, 
the court's instructions and the presumption that the jury followed those 
instructions). Tankovich fails to explain why the instructions were inadequate in 
this regard. Indeed, Tankovich does not even acknowledge the limiting 
instructions in the context of his argument that the court erred in denying his 
motion to sever. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-5.) Instead, Tankovich notes that the 
district court "recognized the problems in the case" as reflected by its statements 
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at sentencing that "it was just as reasonable to believe that the ignorant 
comments that were spewed that day were spewed as a result of anger over 
having a gun pointed at [them] and not over the fact that he was of Puerto Rican 
descent," (Tr., p.2331, Ls.11-15), and that had the "case been tried in front of 
[the court, it] would not have come to the same conclusion" (Tr., p.2334, Ls.17-
18). (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5.) That the court would have reached a different 
verdict does not, however, inform the question of whether the trials should have 
been severed, nor did the court's comments indicate a belief that Tankovich was 
unfairly prejudiced by a jOint trial or any regret for its evidentiary rulings regarding 
the tattoo evidence. 
Even if the court's comments at sentencing were relevant to the analysis 
of Tankovich's claim that his trial should have been severed, the district court 
correctly recognized that the jury concluded otherwise, as it was entitled to do. 
(Tr., p.2331, Ls.16-21.) While the court may have seen the Tankoviches' actions 
as responsive to Ken Requena's exhibition of a firearm, this view of the evidence 
fails to take into consideration the actions that preceded that response from him. 
Tankovich's prejudice argument also ignores the evidence of racial 
motivation beyond Ira's and William's tattoos. In addition to the swastika and 
"Born 2 Kill" inscriptions on the truck Tankovich was driving, Tankovich referred 
to Ken as a "beaner" numerous times. Thus, any argument by Tankovich that 
there was no evidence of his racial intent beyond his brothers' tattoos is not well-
taken. 
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Tankovich also argues that the failure to sever "confounded [him] in 
presenting his defenses." (Appellant's Brief, p.5) This potential source of 
prejudice, however, has no application here. Tankovich's defense would have 
been the same regardless of whether his case was severed, i.e., his statements 
and actions toward Ken Requena were not racially-motivated but were in 
response to Ken pulling a gun on him and his family. (See Tr., p.2198, L.11 -
p.2202, L.18.) Tankovich does not claim otherwise on appeal. Rather, his 
assertion that he was confounded in his defenses relies on the same arguments 
offered in support of his cumulation argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) To that 
extent, his argument that he was confounded fails for the same reasons his 
cumulation argument fails. 
Tankovich has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to sever. 
II. 
Tankovich Cannot Show Error Based On Evidence That Was Not Admitted 
Against Him 
A. Introduction 
Tankovich argues the district court erred by allowing evidence of William's 
and Frank's tattoos, claiming the "evidence was not relevant in [his] case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Because the evidence about which Tankovich complains 
was not admitted against him, Tankovich cannot establish error on this basis. 
11 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 
Idaho 727, 721,24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110,112, 
106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005). 
C. Tankovich Cannot Show Error Based On Evidence That Was Not 
Admitted Against Him 
At trial, the court permitted the state to introduce evidence that (1) 
Tankovich's brother Ira has tattoos on his calves of inverted stars with the words 
"Aryan Pride" (Tr., p.2025, Ls.12-22; Exhibit 6); and (2) William has a tattoo of 
the SS "bolts" symbols on his inner arm (Tr., p.2026, L.14 - p. 2027, L.6; p.2136, 
L.1 - p.2137, L.11; Exhibit 8), and a tattoo on his chest of a three-leaf clover, 
which is a "common symbol worn by Aryan white supremacists" (Tr., p.2028, 
L.15 - p.2029, L.3; p.2137, L.12 - p.2139, L.13; Exhibit 9). The state offered the 
tattoo evidence as probative of the Tankoviches' motive and intent in interacting 
with Ken Requena.4 (Tr., p.78-79, 84.) The court also granted the state's request 
to call Tim Higgins in order to explain the significance of the Tankoviches' 
tattoos. 
4 It appears the court held a hearing on this issue on August 10, 2010 (see R., 
Vol. 1, ROA at p.1 0, 8/11/2010 entry); however, the transcript of that hearing is 
not included in the record. The only transcript of proceedings on August 10, 
2010, relates to Ira Tankovich's sentencing. (See Tr., Table of Contents and 
pp.1474-1509.) Based on what can be gleaned from the court's comments at 
later proceedings, the court concluded the evidence was admissible on the issue 
of intent. (See Tr., p.1519, Ls.17-25; p.2102, L.9-p.2103, L.12.) 
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Mr. Higgins testified about the symbolism behind William's lightning bolts 
tattoo and that he had "seen symbols of this tattoo on people associated with 
Aryan neo-Nazi belief systems or white supremacy belief systems." (Tr., p.2136, 
L.1 - p.2137, L.11.) Mr. Higgins' also testified that three-leaf clover tattoos are 
"common symbols worn by Aryan white supremacists inside." (Tr., p.2139, 
Ls.12-13.) 
On appeal, Tankovich argues that the court erred in allowing the tattoo 
evidence because, he asserts, "said evidence was not relevant to [his] case." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This argument fails because, as noted in Section I, infra, 
the court instructed the jury not to consider this evidence with respect to 
Tankovich. (R., Vol. 4, p.651; Tr., p.2124, Ls.9-23.) Thus, the evidence was not 
admitted against him. 
Even if the court's limiting instructions can be read as only applying to Mr. 
Higgins' testimony as opposed to evidence of the existence of the tattoos, 
Tankovich is incorrect in his assertion that the tattoos are irrelevant. In order to 
prove malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious harassment, the 
crimes with which Tankovich was charged, the state was required to prove, inter 
alia, that Tankovich had the "intent to intimidate or harass Kenneth Requena 
because of Kenneth Requena's race and/or color and/or ancestry and/or nation 
[sic] origin," (R., Vol. 4, p.657), and that Tankovich conspired with Ira and William 
to commit this offense (R., Vol. 4, p.658). William's and Ira's tattoos were 
relevant to these elements. 
13 
Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the 
case, and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable 
than it would be without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 
544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Tankovich actions toward Ken 
Requena were done in concert with his two brothers, both of whom had racially-
charged tattoos. This affiliation made it "more probable" that the Tankoviches' 
actions were racially motivated than it would be without the evidence. As such, 
the tattoos were relevant and the district court correctly concluded as much. (Tr., 
p.178, L.18 - p.179, L.23.) 
Tankovich argues that, even if relevant, the tattoos were "unfairly 
prejudicial against a man who does not have such tattoos on his body." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) To the contrary, any prejudice to Tankovich as a result of 
the evidence that his brothers' tattoos did not substantially outweigh the 
probative value of the tattoos. I.R.E. 403. In ruling on the admissibility of the 
tattoos in the context of the state's I.R.E. 404(b) motion, the court, citing State v. 
Rund, 2007 WL 657287 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2007) (unpublished), concluded the 
evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr., p.179, L.24 - p.180, L.24.) This was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
The defendants in Rund, like the Tankoviches, were charged with 
malicious harassment for an assault on an African-American and sought to 
exclude evidence of their swastika tattoos. 2007 WL at *1-2. The court in Rund 
noted that, although "the evidence was prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial," 
reasoning: 
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Where the state must prove that the defendants chose their 
victim because of the victim's race, evidence that the defendants 
are bigoted against that particular race is highly probative. The 
tattoos as expression of that bigotry are no more prejudicial than 
Rund's use of the word "nigger" or if Rund and Luyster had both 
declared that they hated African-Americans. Washington courts 
have previously held bigoted statements are admissible as 
circumstantial evidence of victim selection. Just as bigoted 
statements would be admissible despite their prejudice, tattoos 
reflecting bigotry are also more probative than prejudicial. 
2007 WL at *3 (citations omitted). 
The district court correctly followed the rationale of Rund in rejecting 
Tankovich's claim that the tattoo evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Further, any 
prejudicial impact flowing from the fact that William and Ira had racial tattoos was 
diluted by evidence of racism directly attributable to Tankovich - the swastika 
and "Born 2 Kill" written on his truck and the fact that he repeatedly called Ken 
Requena a "beaner." This independent evidence of racial motivation directly 
attributable to Tankovich also renders any error in the admission of the tattoo 
evidence against Tankovich harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I.C.R. 52; 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222,245 P.3d 961,974 (2010). 
III. 
Tankovich's Challenge To The Admission Of Expert Testimony Regarding The 
Racial Symbolism Of His Co-Defendants' Tattoos Is Not Preserved; Even If 
Considered. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Racial Symbolism 
Associated With The Tattoo Evidence Was The Proper Subject Of Expert 
Testimony 
A. Introduction 
In addition to his argument that the tattoo evidence was irrelevant, 
Tankovich also argues that Mr. Higgins' testimony "invaded the province of the 
jury with regard to what those tattoos meant or how they were significant." 
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(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) This Court should decline to consider this argument 
because it is not preserved for appeal. Even if considered, Tankovich has failed 
to establish the district court erred in admitting Mr. Higgins' testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961,976 (2010). 
The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Almaraz, 2012 WL 1948499 *17 (2012) (citations omitted). 
C. Tankovich's Challenge To The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony On The 
Racial Symbolism Of The Tankoviches' Tattoos Is Not Preserved 
Tankovich claims the district court erred in allowing Mr. Higgins to testify 
regarding the racial symbolism of the co-defendants' tattoos, asserting such 
testimony "invaded the province of the jury." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Although 
Tankovich accurately notes that "[h]e objected to the proposed evidence" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8 (citing R., pp.509-11)), the basis for Tankovich's objection 
was that the evidence was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b), not that it was 
inadmissible under the rules applicable to expert testimony, I.R.E. 701, 702. 
Tankovich's objection pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) was inadequate to preserve 
whatever other objections he thinks should or could have been made at trial. 
State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citations omitted) ("An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and 
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different basis for excluding the evidence."). Further, Tankovich has failed to cite 
the relevant legal standards for expert testimony or present any argument as to 
why Mr. Higgins' testimony was improper under these standards. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9 (citing only I.R.E. 403).) Tankovich's failure in this 
regard also precludes consideration of his claim. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). 
D. Even If The Court Considers The Merits Of Tankovich's Claim That The 
Racial Symbolism Associated With The Co-Defendants Tattoos Was Not 
Properly The Subject Of Expert Testimony. The Claim Fails 
Even if the Court considers the merits of Tankovich's claim that Mr. 
Higgins' testimony regarding the racial symbolism of the co-defendants' tattoos 
was not properly the subject of expert testimony, application of the correct legal 
standards shows the claim fails. "To be admissible, the expert's testimony must 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764,770 (2007) (quotations omitted); 
see also I.R.E. 702. "The function of the expert is to provide testimony on 
subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the 
average juror." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 
1998) (citations omitted). Only where the normal experience of the jurors permits 
them to draw proper conclusions from the facts and circumstances are expert 
conclusions or opinions inadmissible. 19.:. 
The district court concluded Mr. Higgins' testimony regarding the racial 
undertones of William's and Ira's tattoos was proper because Mr. Higgins, based 
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on his training and experience, could provide information beyond the ken of the 
average juror that the "SS" lightning bolts tattoo and the three-leaf clover tattoo 
are associated with individual who subscribe to racist beliefs.5 (Tr., p.2100, L.13 
- p.2109, L.8; p.2112, Ls.4-11.) Tankovich has failed to establish this was an 
abuse of discretion. See, §.:.9.,., Almaraz at *16-18 (finding no error in the 
admission of testimony that defendant was in a "shooter's crouch" and testimony 
regarding when the "impact of the shot occurred based on [the expert's] 
experience and training in video analysis"). 
IV. 
There Was Substantial. Competent Evidence Presented At Trial To Support The 
Jury Verdicts Finding Tankovich Guilty Of Malicious Harassment And Conspiracy 
To Commit Malicious Harassment 
A. Introduction 
Tankovich challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions for malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious 
harassment.6 (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Tankovich's sufficiency argument 
5 Contrary to Tankovich's claim on appeal, Mr. Higgins did not offer any 
testimony on Ira's "Aryan Pride" tattoos. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Rather, the 
district court agreed with Tankovich's position that those words "speak for 
themselves." (Tr., p.2108, Ls.6-12; see also p.2111, Ls.7-14.) 
6 The heading of Tankovich's argument alleges the district court erred in "failing 
to dismiss the case against Frank Tankovich due to insufficient evidence," which 
seems to suggest that Tankovich moved for "dismiss[al]" on this basis. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This is true to the extent Tankovich moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge after the state rested its case in 
chief. (Tr., p.2143, Ls. 12-13 Uoining in William's Rule 29 motion).) However, 
the substance of Tankovich's argument seems to simply challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence, presumably for both charges, without regard to his 
Rule 29 motion. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) The state will, 
therefore, respond to this argument accordingly. 
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relies, in part, on his claim that the tattoo evidence was inadmissible. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Beyond that, Tankovich argues "the evidence of racial 
intent is extremely deficient." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Tankovich's argument is 
without merit. A review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state 
presented substantial, competent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Tankovich committed the crimes of malicious harassment and conspiracy to 
commit malicious harassment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) 
(citations omitted). "[S]ubstantial evidence may exist even when the evidence 
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. In fact, 
even when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a 
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also 
gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt." kL. 
In conducting its review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for 
that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. kL. 
Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed 
in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. kL. 
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C. The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That Tankovich 
Was Guilty Of Malicious Harassment And Conspiracy To Commit 
Malicious Harassment 
Count I of the Indictment charged Tankovich with malicious harassment, in 
violation of I.C. § 18-7902 and Count" charged Tankovich with conspiracy to 
commit malicious harassment. (R., Vol. 1, pp.29-31.) As noted in Section ", 
supra, the malicious harassment charge required the state to prove "intent to 
intimidate or harass [Kenneth Requena] because of [Kenneth Requena's] race 
and/or color and/or ancestry and/or national origin." (R., Vol. 1, p.30.) The state 
presented sUbstantial competent evidence establishing all elements of both 
charged offenses, including sufficient evidence, from which the jury concluded 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tankovich had the requisite intent. 
Tankovich, however, argues the evidence of racial intent was "extremely 
deficient, especially when considered without the tattoo evidence, which should 
not have been allowed." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Tankovich also relies on the 
district court's comments at sentencing that it would have reached a different 
result. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The first flaw in Tankovich's argument is that it 
ignores the correct legal standard by suggesting this Court's review is limited to 
only the evidence he claims was properly admitted. This is not the law. A review 
of the sufficiency of the evidence includes consideration of all evidence 
presented to the jury regardless of whether an appellate court later decides the 
evidence was inadmissible. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 893-94, 231 P.3d 
532, 538-39 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]aking into account the improperly admitted 
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judgment of conviction, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that 
Moore had previously been convicted of two DUI offenses."). 
The second flaw in Tankovich's argument is his misplaced reliance on 
what the district court stated its verdict would have been. The district court's 
interpretation of the evidence is not the relevant legal standard. The question is 
whether there was substantial, competent evidence from which the jury conclude 
that Tankovich was guilty of the charged offenses. There was. Thus, even if it 
would have been "just as reasonable to conclude" that the Tankoviches acted in 
"anger over a gun having been pointed at [them]," the jury was not required to 
reach this conclusion. Alternative interpretations of the evidence are inadequate 
to establish the evidence was legally insufficient. Tankovich's claim that the 
evidence was inadequate to support his convictions fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tankovich's 
convictions for malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious 
harassment. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2012 
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